Non-utilitarian doesn't equal agent relative. Your last example is paradigm agent relative.
Unless you think everyone has a special duty to their children over others. The "everyone is t he key here" If everyone has an obligation to keep a promise under conditions C then it seems to be agent neutral. Since there are really agent relative examples--your last example; I'm not sure we want deontological constraints to be agent relative. They are non-maximizing constraints, but every agent has the same duty. So the maximizing/non-maximizing distinction for me doesn't match the agent neutral/agent relative distinction. Nice to get some phil discussion
Well, do you agree that egoism is agent-relative? Even though we could describe it as "for all persons x and y, x has a moral obligation to benefit y iff x=y"? We each have that moral obligation, to benefit only ourselves. The fact that we can describe duty in universal terms doesn't make it agent-neutral. I agree that non-utilitarian doesn't equal agent-relative, and that the maximizing/non-maximizing distinction is orthogonal.
"...which moral approach is the best pragmatic fit..."
That would be my conclusion. We have an instinct to support kin and our community so a 'simpler', more achievable world is one where we prioritise such and expect others to look after their kin and community. However, I don't think 'prioritise' means we can ignore the plight of others much less fortunate, particularly if the game is essentiallly rigged in our favour, so Vance is not off the hook.
I agree that we have an instinct to prioritize kin, but we also have a competing instinct to engage in cooperative altruism with unrelated others. What's tricky is to find a pragmatic via media. I certainly did not mean to let Vance off the hook! He fails to even acknowledge the appeal of agent-neutral moral theories, which is a real failing. Of course, Pope Francis has his own biases.
"I’m inclined to defer to the Pope’s grasp of theology over Vance’s"
That inclination is a mistake. Vance understands Augustine correctly. Francis does not.
Does any sane person really think his moral duties to his own children are the same as his duties to a stranger who lives thousands of miles away? The commandment is "love your neighbor," not "love your neighbor exactly the same as each person ten thousand miles away." Jesus chose the word "neighbor."
"But if any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." 1 Timothy 5:8
Keeping a promise would seem to be an agent neutral duty since everyone has that duty.
True agent relative duties--say to kin over non-relatives; agent relative since it's your relatives that have dibs on your fortune. Not everyone has that duty., unless you think everyone has a duty to their kin over non-relatives Then I would call it an agent-neutral duty.
Here's why I think promise-keeping is agent relative: because you you're not obligated to make promises to all, or to satisfy the content of the promise to all. Only to those with whom you have established a personal relationship. In fact, making a promise could constitute the establishing of that relationship. This conditional is true: for all x, if I make a promise to x, then I'm obligated to fulfill that promise to x. But so is this conditional, which is surely agent relative: for all x, if x is my offspring, then I have duties of care to x. Furthermore, who do we make promises to? Conspecifics with whom we frequently interact, exactly how we instinctively pick out kin.
I tend to agree with you, Richard. Kant’s Categorical Imperative, in all three forms, is “neural agent” in both its universality and its specific application. Am I missing something?
Non-utilitarian doesn't equal agent relative. Your last example is paradigm agent relative.
Unless you think everyone has a special duty to their children over others. The "everyone is t he key here" If everyone has an obligation to keep a promise under conditions C then it seems to be agent neutral. Since there are really agent relative examples--your last example; I'm not sure we want deontological constraints to be agent relative. They are non-maximizing constraints, but every agent has the same duty. So the maximizing/non-maximizing distinction for me doesn't match the agent neutral/agent relative distinction. Nice to get some phil discussion
Well, do you agree that egoism is agent-relative? Even though we could describe it as "for all persons x and y, x has a moral obligation to benefit y iff x=y"? We each have that moral obligation, to benefit only ourselves. The fact that we can describe duty in universal terms doesn't make it agent-neutral. I agree that non-utilitarian doesn't equal agent-relative, and that the maximizing/non-maximizing distinction is orthogonal.
"...which moral approach is the best pragmatic fit..."
That would be my conclusion. We have an instinct to support kin and our community so a 'simpler', more achievable world is one where we prioritise such and expect others to look after their kin and community. However, I don't think 'prioritise' means we can ignore the plight of others much less fortunate, particularly if the game is essentiallly rigged in our favour, so Vance is not off the hook.
I agree that we have an instinct to prioritize kin, but we also have a competing instinct to engage in cooperative altruism with unrelated others. What's tricky is to find a pragmatic via media. I certainly did not mean to let Vance off the hook! He fails to even acknowledge the appeal of agent-neutral moral theories, which is a real failing. Of course, Pope Francis has his own biases.
"I’m inclined to defer to the Pope’s grasp of theology over Vance’s"
That inclination is a mistake. Vance understands Augustine correctly. Francis does not.
Does any sane person really think his moral duties to his own children are the same as his duties to a stranger who lives thousands of miles away? The commandment is "love your neighbor," not "love your neighbor exactly the same as each person ten thousand miles away." Jesus chose the word "neighbor."
"But if any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." 1 Timothy 5:8
It seems to me that one's morality is fully on display via the company one keeps and the books that one endorses.
http://www.thenerdreich.com/unhumans-jd-vance-and-the-language-of-genocide
Keeping a promise would seem to be an agent neutral duty since everyone has that duty.
True agent relative duties--say to kin over non-relatives; agent relative since it's your relatives that have dibs on your fortune. Not everyone has that duty., unless you think everyone has a duty to their kin over non-relatives Then I would call it an agent-neutral duty.
Here's why I think promise-keeping is agent relative: because you you're not obligated to make promises to all, or to satisfy the content of the promise to all. Only to those with whom you have established a personal relationship. In fact, making a promise could constitute the establishing of that relationship. This conditional is true: for all x, if I make a promise to x, then I'm obligated to fulfill that promise to x. But so is this conditional, which is surely agent relative: for all x, if x is my offspring, then I have duties of care to x. Furthermore, who do we make promises to? Conspecifics with whom we frequently interact, exactly how we instinctively pick out kin.
I tend to agree with you, Richard. Kant’s Categorical Imperative, in all three forms, is “neural agent” in both its universality and its specific application. Am I missing something?
See if my reply to Dick looks adequate.